



REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANT

To the Management of Symantec Corporation:

We have examined for the Symantec, GeoTrust, and Thawte branded Certification Authorities ("CAs") (collectively referred to as Symantec CA) operations at Mountain View, California, USA; New Castle, Delaware, USA; Dublin, Ireland; Melbourne, Australia; and Cape Town, South Africa and for Verisign, Inc. ("Verisign"), an independent service organization that provides datacenter hosting services to Symantec at the New Castle, Delaware location:

- a) Symantec's disclosure of its extended validation code signing (EV CS) certificate lifecycle management business practices in its Certification Practices Statements, STN Certificate Policy, and its disclosure of the services and related controls provided by Verisign as enumerated in [Attachment A](#), including Symantec's commitment to provide EV CS certificates in conformity with the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines on the Symantec website;
- b) the provision of such services in accordance its disclosed practices; and
- c) the effectiveness of Symantec's controls and Verisign's controls, where applicable, over
 - key and EV CS certificate integrity,
 - the authenticity and confidentiality of EV CS subscriber and relying party information, and
 - continuity of key and EV CS certificate lifecycle management operations

throughout the period December 1, 2016 to October 31, 2017 for its CAs as enumerated in [Attachment B](#).

Symantec's management is responsible for these disclosures and for maintaining effective controls based on the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Extended Validation Code Signing v1.4](#). Our responsibility is to express an opinion based on our examination.

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at Symantec and their effect on assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. Our examination did not extend to controls at individual subscriber and relying party locations and we have not evaluated the effectiveness of such controls.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with standards for attestation engagements established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform the examination to obtain reasonable assurance about whether, throughout the period December 1, 2016 to October 31, 2017, for the CAs enumerated in [Attachment B](#), in all material respects:



- a) Symantec disclosed its EV CS certificate lifecycle management business practices in its Certification Practices Statements, STN Certificate Policy and the services and related controls provided by Verisign as enumerated in [Attachment A](#), including Symantec's commitment to provide EV CS certificates in conformity with the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines on the Symantec website, and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices; and
- b) Symantec and Verisign, where applicable, maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
 - the integrity of keys and EV CS certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles, and
 - EV CS subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by Symantec)

based on the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Extended Validation Code Signing v1.4](#).

Because of the nature and inherent limitations of controls, Symantec's ability to meet the aforementioned criteria may be affected. For example, controls may not prevent, or detect and correct, error, fraud, unauthorized access to systems and information, or failure to comply with internal and external policies or requirements. Also, the projection of any conclusions based on our findings to future periods is subject to the risk that changes may alter the validity of such conclusions.

In our opinion, throughout the December 1, 2016 to October 31, 2017, in all material respects:

- a) Symantec disclosed its EV CS certificate lifecycle management business practices in its Certification Practices Statements, STN Certificate Policy and the services and related controls provided by Verisign as enumerated in [Attachment A](#), including Symantec's commitment to provide EV CS certificates in conformity with the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines on the Symantec website, and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices; and
- b) Symantec and Verisign, where applicable, maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
 - the integrity of keys and EV CS certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles, and
 - EV CS subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by Symantec)

based on the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Extended Validation Code Signing v1.4](#).

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of Symantec's services other than its CA operations at Mountain View, California, USA; New Castle, Delaware, USA; Melbourne, Australia and Cape Town, South Africa nor the suitability of any of Symantec's services for any customer's intended purpose.



Effective at the close of business on October 31, 2017, Symantec sold its CA business operations to DigiCert Inc.

Symantec's use of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities - Extended Validation Code Signing Seal constitutes a symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to update this report or provide any additional assurance.

BDO USA, LLP

St. Louis, Missouri
January 31, 2018



Attachment A

Certification Practice Statement and Certificate Policy Versions in Scope

Policy Name	Version	Date
Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certification Practice Statement	3.8.28	September 8, 2017
Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certification Practice Statement	3.8.27	December 19, 2016
Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certification Practice Statement	3.8.26	September 9, 2016
Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy	2.8.24	September 8, 2017
Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy	2.8.23	December 19, 2016
Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy	2.8.22	September 9, 2016
GeoTrust Certification Practice Statement	1.1.21	September 8, 2017
GeoTrust Certification Practice Statement	1.1.20	December 19, 2016
GeoTrust Certification Practice Statement	1.1.19	September 9, 2016
thawte Certification Practice Statement	3.7.18	September 8, 2017
thawte Certification Practice Statement	3.7.17	December 19, 2016
thawte Certification Practice Statement	3.7.16	September 9, 2016

Description of Services Provided for Symantec and Related Controls Exercised by Verisign at the New Castle, Delaware Location

Symantec has entered into an agreement with Verisign Inc. (Verisign), to provide datacenter hosting services at the New Castle, Delaware datacenter (the datacenter). Verisign performs the same physical and environmental security controls as Symantec has disclosed in Section 5 and Section 6 of the Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certification Practice Statement; however, Verisign performs UPS maintenance quarterly, rather than semi-annually.

Verisign has implemented the following physical and environmental security controls to protect Symantec assets at the datacenter. Production systems housed in the datacenter are protected by multiple tiers of physical security, with access to the lower tier required before gaining access to the next highest tier. The datacenter enforces individual access control through the use of two-factor authentication, including biometrics. Physical access to the datacenter is automatically logged. Visitors to the datacenter are required to sign a log at the security office, wear a visitor badge, and be escorted while onsite. The datacenter facilities are manned continuously by on-site security personnel and the premises are continuously video monitored and recorded. Multiple generators, UPS, HVAC and fire suppression systems have been implemented at the datacenter.



Attachment B

List of CAs In-Scope

Root CA	Serial Number	SHA1 Thumbprint	SHA2 Thumbprint
C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., CN=GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority	sha1WithRSAEncryption	18ACB56AFD69B6153A636CAFDAFAC4A1	32:3C:11:8E:1B:F7:B8:B6:52:54:E2:E2:10:0D:D6:02:90:37:F0:96
C=US, O=thawte, Inc., OU=Certification Services Division, OU=(c) 2008 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=thawte Primary Root CA - G3	sha256WithRSAEncryption	600197B746A7EAB4B49AD64B2FF790FB	F1:8B:53:8D:1B:E9:03:B6:A6:F0:56:43:5B:17:15:89:CA:F3:6B:F2
C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5	sha1WithRSAEncryption	18DAD19E267DE8BB4A2158CDC6B3B4A	4E:B6:D5:78:49:9B:1C:CF:5F:58:1E:AD:56:BE:3D:9B:67:44:A5:E5
C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2008 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority	sha256WithRSAEncryption	401AC46421B31321030EBBE4121AC51D	36:79:CA:35:66:87:72:30:4D:30:A5:FB:87:3B:0F:A7:7B:B7:0D:54

Class 3 CA	Serial Number	SHA1 Thumbprint	SHA2 Thumbprint
C=US, O=Symantec Corporation, CN=Symantec SAS EV Code Signing CA	5D74EC40C72FA11E6B91C2E5BAC472FF	8E:F6:55:31:C8:88:7C:73:9E:2B:BD:51:8A:37:FA:C2:CD:69:0D:53	E8:65:F5:83:A9:28:CC:B6:A7:28:6B:94:E7:92:0E:E1:F4:99:8C:03:0B:43:86:89:E9:58:3B:CC:D6:AC:52:61
C=US, O=Symantec Corporation, OU=Symantec Trust Network, CN=Symantec Class 3 Extended Validation Code Signing CA	6C59EFA9E100E10EE306BA8FE0292559	F8:D2:C1:03:80:ED:A2:77:46:55:E5:61:9D:B7:D0:2F:7D:9E:85:0A	16:9D:AF:83:C0:87:0A:B8:92:7C:99:D3:FC:07:74:DD:F3:4F:BA:28:B0:2B:88:1D:CD:0B:63:3B:6D:71:B2:BA
C=US, O=Symantec Corporation, OU=Symantec Trust Network, CN=Symantec Class 3 Extended Validation Code Signing CA - G2	191A32CB759C97B8CFAC118DD5127F49	5B:8F:88:C8:0A:73:D3:5F:76:CD:41:2A:9E:74:E9:16:59:4D:FA:67	F7:26:C8:89:13:36:B1:B9:7C:BC:86:F5:96:F1:26:7F:C1:80:15:21:22:57:3E:76:D5:14:5A:7C:64:E2:CF:F7
C=US, O=Symantec Corporation, OU=Symantec Trust Network, CN=Symantec Class 3 Extended Validation Code Signing CA - G3	2A953218E10B4B7B6FD14B2A9EC30D26	E9:EA:87:52:65:C6:A3:39:11:4B:3E:91:48:4E:E5:02:46:E4:A7:06	C2:67:DC:11:5D:57:DD:02:26:27:9B:34:6D:F1:95:3D:D2:C0:7A:85:CB:48:A0:D8:99:FD:57:24:F5:AF:68:1F
C=US, O=thawte, Inc., CN=thawte EV Code Signing CA	779A2BE6DEEDA2BFB902CA8E3668B9AF	B1:7E:FE:36:89:24:DF:F5:0A:91:9C:58:A6:A8:6E:F1:81:FA:C5:6E	F3:76:F6:E5:BF:66:0F:6B:ED:B7:68:DC:D1:30:3E:AD:D4:A9:6F:2E:D7:A9:77:17:E8:78:FA:E6:BB:59:59:FA